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ABSTRACT
THE CUMULATIVE UNANTICIPATED CHANGE IN INTEREST RATES:
EVIDENCE ON THE NISINTERNEDIATION HYPOTHESIS
J. Huston McCulloch
The term structure of interest rates is carefully analyzed
over the period 1947—77 in order to construct a monthly series
on cumulative unanticipated changes in long—term interest
rates. This series is a sort of synthetic interest rate,
changes in which over several months or years represent en-
tirely unanticipated changes in interest rates. The behavior
of this series is examined over recognized business fluctua-
tions, and it is found to be actually more reliably pro-cyclic
than the raw long—term interest rate, in spite of Kessel's
finding that the market tends to correctly predict the direc-
tion of change of interest rates over phases. That the series
is pro-cyclic supports the hypothesis we have put forward in
another paper, tnat business fluctuations may be caused by
"misintermediation", by which we mean the traditional mis-





Chestnut Hill, MA 02167
617/969—0100, Ext. 3686THE CUMULATIVE UNANTICIPATED CHANGE IN INTEREST RATES:
EVIDENCE ON THE MISINTERMEDIATION HYPOTHESIS
Inan earlier paper (McCulloch 1977) we have argued that business
fluctuations may arise as a consequence of the traditional mismatching of
asset and liability maturities on the part of financial intermediaries.
We call this mismatching "misintermediation."
Briefly, that argument runs as follows: In the Fisherian model of
the determination of the term structure of interest rates, planned supply
of aggregate output of consumption goods is assumed somehow to match planned
demand for these goods point by point throughout the future.1 As the econ-
omy moves forward in time, expectations regarding future interest rates,
as reflected in the original term structure's implicit forward' interest
rates, will, barring unforeseen technological developments or "dynamic
inconsistency" in tastes, be perfectly realized. Furthermore, all supply
and demand plans will be perfectly realized, and the economy will develop
without aggregate excess demand or aggregate excess supply of current output
ever appearing. The economy's growth rate will be relatively steady, and
any residual fluctuations in it will have been fully anticipated.
However, we actually live in a world of institutionalized misinter—
mediation. For centuries banking has been a highly regulated industry,
and this regulation has kept it in its traditional mold of borrowing
short and lending long, in spite of the the risks that that
practice entails.This misintermediation breaks the link
between current plans for future demand and current plans for future supply,
a link that would exist to a much greater extent in the world of balanced
'For a modern restatement of this model,see 1-lirshleifer (1970), 109—113.—2—
intermediation. Although the present discounted value of planned future
demand must equal the present discounted value of planned future supply,
there is no reason why planned supply will equal demand point by point
throughout the future. As the economy moves forward in time, planned
supply of current output will not necessarily match planned demand. In
the event of a recession (an excess supply of current output in terms of
prior plans), an unanticipated fall in interest rates will be necessary to
clear the market for current output. In the event of a planned excess
demand (a disequilibrius boom), an unanticipated rise in interest rates
will be necessary.1
It is well known that interest rates are pro—cyclic. In fact, the
NBER uses the peaks and troughs in various interest rate series to help
date the standard reference cycles.2 If the yield curve were always flat,
or at least had no systematic change in shape over business cycles, it
would at once follow that the unanticipated changes in interest rates are
in accord with the predictions of the misintermediation hypothesis.
However, Reuben Kessel (whose untimely death in 1975 was a great loss
to the profession) demonstrated, in his classic work on The Cyclical Behavior
of the Term Structure of Interest Rates, that at cyclic troughs the yield
curvetendsto be unusually upward sloping, so that immediately prior to an
expansion, the market is expecting interest rates to rise. Furthermore,
1Cagan (1969) investigates the relationship between interest rates and
business cycles. We, in contrast, argue that it is not so much the level
of interest rates that is important, but rather whether the current level
was arrived at by unanticipated changes.
2Burns and Mitchell (1947).—3—
at peaks, the yield curve is often "humped", reflecting a small liquidity
premium at the short end together with anticipations of a fall in interest
rates over the coming contraction (1965, 59—95). The casual evidence is
therefore ambiguous. The market may be correctly anticipating the cyclical
changes in interest rates, underanticipating these changes, or even over—
anticipating them.
The purpose of this paper is to determine how unanticipated changes
in interest rates really behave over the business cycle. We do this by
carefully analyzing the term structure of interest rates, and constructing
a monthly series on cumulative unanticipated changes in interest rates.
This series is a sort of synthetic interest rate, changes in which over
several months or years reflect entirely unanticipated changes in interest
rates. We then examine how this series behaves over recognized business




For the specific purpose of investigating the misintermediation hypo-
thesis, the present author has developed a technique of curve—fitting the
term structure of interest rates from security prices, so as to determine
implicit forward interest rates as precisely as possible. This technique
is described in detail in two previous papers (McCulloch 1971, 1975b).
Briefly stated, for each point t in time for which we have security price
11f business fluctuations haveany predictable regularity, their being
associated systematically with certain unanticipated changes in interest
rates violates the assumptions of rational expectations. However, in an
earlier paper (McCulloch l975c), we have presented evidence that business
"cycles" have no such regularity. See also Anderson (1977), and Savin (1977).—4—
data, we estimate a "discount function" cS(t,in)which gives the value at
time t of a promise to repay one dollar at future date s, where
s=t+m (1)
This function is constrained to obey
(t, 0) =1. (2)
We would expect to find
ô(t, in) > 0 (3)
and
D2c5(t, in) < 0, (4)
and in fact the empirical discount functions we estimated for this
study all obey (3) and (4) without imposing them as constraints.This
curve is roughly an exponential decay curve with respect to in,exceptthat
its rate of exponential decay need not be constant. Its average rateof
decay is the single payment yield fl(t, in):
(t, m) =
— logcS(t, m). (5)







We define this rate in terms of the future date s, rather than the term
to maturity in,inorder to emphasize the importance of comparing the move-
ment over time of the forward rate for a given date in the future.This
instantaneous forward rate corresponds to a hypothetical forward contract
for a loan one instant in duration, so its value for any one s is notof
any great macroeconomic significance. More importantis the—5—
mean forward interest rate r(t, s1, s) on a loan to begin at future





— (7) S2 S
Mean forward interest rates are no problem to calculate, but they
provide us with an unmanageable wealth of data, since we may pick any
and s., obeying ts <s s (t) (8) 1 2 max
where s(t) is the maturity date of the longest term bond observed in the max
market at time t. This embarrassment of riches is somewhat alleviated
by concentrating on the instantaneous forward rate instead, since because
of the identity
S
1 i. r(t,5, s) — ip(t,s)ds, (9)
21
it can be used as a two—dimensional summary of the three dimensional jumble
of mean forward rates. Still, as t changes, p(t, s) may go up for some
values of s at the same time it goes down for other values of s. We want
some sort of average of these forward rate movements for all maturities.
With observations on the term structure tt years apart, we could consider
s*(t) =min(s(t),Smax(t + st)), (10)
and compute the amounts (t) by which the forward rate on a loan to begin
at t + t and to end at s*(t) is exceeded by the subsequently observed
corresponding spot rate:
(t) =ri(t+ t, s*(t)....t_ t) —r(t,t + M,s*(t)). (11)—6—
Then the series
n-i
=fl(tsmax(t)_t)+ i (t+i M),t = t0+n t (12)
1=0
would behave like an interest rate, yet first differences in it would,
after adjustment for a liquidity premium, reflect pure unanticipated changes
in interest rates.
However, the series defined in (12) is not entirely satisfactory.
In principle, with ideal data, we could estimate 5(t, m) and therefore
p(t, t+m)forarbitrarily large m, even several hundred years into the
future.1 The mean forward rate, because of its property (9), gives equal
weights to p(t, s) for all these maturities. We would prefer somehow to
give greater weight to the immediate future, declining weight to the inter-
mediate future, and little or no weight to the very distant future. Further-
more, in practice S(t, m) can only be estimated with decreasing relative
accuracy as m becomes very large. At some maturity, perhaps 60 to 80 years,
any empirical estimate of it would be insignificantly different from zero,
even though we believe that it is "really" still positive.2 Beyond that
point, mean forward rates defined by (7) lose all statistical significance.
Both these problems could be avoided by arbitrarily selecting a
maturity, say 10 or 20 years, that one feels includes the most important
forward rates. However, this procedure still gives equal weight to all
included maturities. Furthermore, forward rates for the excluded maturities
11n the 1920's, there were railroad bonds outstanding with three, four,
and even five hundred years to maturity.
2We have never actuallyused a data set with long enough maturities that
this has happened, though in principle it should.—7—
do affect to some degree the terms on whichcurrent output can be exchanged
for aggregated future output. We would prefernot to disregard them al-
together.
This problem can be solved by means of a newconcept developed by Burman
and White (1972), called the "par bond yield". It haslong been well known
that the notion of a "bond yield curve" is somewhatambiguous, since unless
the yield curve is flat, bonds with the same terminalmaturity but different
coupon rates should not in general have the same internal rate of return
or "yield to maturity") Even using the bond's "average duration"does not
solve this problem. However, there is anunambiguous yield on bonds of
maturity m that just happen to be selling at par. It does notequal the
point payment yield, but is a well definedconcept in its own right. It
is now used by the Bank of England as therepresentative yield curve for
coupon—bearing bonds, though it has not yet been officially adopted by
the U.S. Treasury.
This par bond yield y(t, in) can be computedstraightforwardly from
the discount function, using the fact that ifa bond is selling exactly
at par, its yield just equals its coupon rate. Ifwe assume continuous
coupons for the sake of simplicity, this coupon rate can be found by solving
the equation2
y(t,m) f6(t,ii)d+ 100 &(t,m) =100 (13)
1Seee.g. Buse (1970). Schaefer (1976) offers some new insights into
this familiar problem.
2Cp. Burman and White(1972, 484), whose definition is in terms of a bond
that pays semiannual coupons, and McCulloch(1975b, 822),where the definition





Theideal properties of the par bond yield, from the point of view of
the present study, arise from the following identity:
p(t, t+p)(t, i)d = — 100D2&(t,i)dii
—100[ô(t, in)—d(t,O)]
=lOO[l—5(t,m)] . (15)
This identify implies that
fp(t,t+ii) ô(t, ji)d
y(t,m) =° . (16)
fS(t, ii)di
Equation (16) states that the yield on par bonds with terminal maturity
inisa weighted average of the instantaneous forward rates for all
maturities out to in,wherethe weights are the present value of a dollar
at the maturity in question, and therefore serve as a good index of the
importance of these rates for the current economy. The single payment
yield to maturity r(t,m) as defined in (5) does not necessarily approach
an asymptotic value as inbecomeslarge, since there is no telling what
instantaneous forward rates will be in the very distant future, so long
as they are positive. The par bond yield curve, on the other hand,
must approach an asymptote, so long as perpetuities have finite prices.
Equation (16), incidentally, answers an objection that is sometimes
raised against the hypothesis that long—term rates reflect averages of—9-.
expected future short—term rates. Joan Robinson (1951, 102n.), for
example, has protested that if this were true, anyone who buys a consol
would have "to think he knows exactly what the rates of interest will be
every day from now to Kingdom Come," which obviously no reasonable person
does. However, he does not have to know these rates exactly in order to
define the consol rate to any desired precision. In fact, for any given
precision, his beliefs regarding these rates can dissolve into total ignor—
ance beyond some finite horizon far short of Kingdom Come.1
The approach we adopt in this paper is to compute a forward par bond yield,
and then compare it to the subsequently observed corresponding spot par bond yield
one month later. These differences, adjusted for liquidity premium, are
again pure unanticipated changes in interest rates. When we accumulate
these forecasting errors, changes in the resulting one—dimensional series
over business cycle phases will also represent unanticipated changes in
interest rates.
Three maturities are relevant here:rn,1, the distance into the
future the implicit forward contract is to begin (which we will set equal
to st), m2, the duration of the forward contract, andm3, the distance
into the future of the completion date of the forward contract. We
have rn1 + m2 =
m3.The forward par bond yield b(t, m1, m3) is then the
coupon rate that will make the value of a forward bond, evaluated at time
t's term structure, just equal to par, discounted to time t using time t's
term structure. To find this rate, we solve
'The obverse of this proposition is that when p(rn) is inferred fromactual
bond prices, it has an intrinsic tendency to become increasingly poorly
defined as m becomes very large.—10—
m3
b(t,m1, m3) fô(t,ii)di.i+ 100 iS(t,m3) =1006(t, ) (17)
to obtain
1
l00[cS(t, m )—5(t, m )1




Byan operation analogous to (15) and (16), it can be shown that this
forward bond yield is an average of the forward rates p(t, s) for s
between t + in1andt + in3,eachweighted by 5(t, s—t). The differences
y(t) =y(t+t, s*(t)— t —t)—b(t,t, s*(t)_t) (19)
then represent, after adjustment for liquidity premium, pure unanticipated
changes in interestrates.2
DATA
In order to abstract completely from default risk, the data we use are
for U.S. Treasury Securities. Price data were assembled for the last business
day of each month, from the end of December 1946 to the end of May 1977,
a total of 366 months. Since these dates represent the dividing line between
two months, they could equally well be associated with either month. We
will refer to them in this paper as representing the "beginning" of the
subsequent month, i.e., January 1947 to June 1977. In fact, the quotations
1 Cp. (14) above and McCulloch (1975b, 825).
2Unfortunately, these differences of weighted averages of forward rates have
no simple interpretation in terms of a weighted average of differences in
forward rates, since the relative weights change between t and t + tt.
Nevertheless, it can be shown that an across—the—board increase in forward
rates, whatever the shape of the forward curve, will lead to a positive value
of (t), even though the new term structure will be giving higher weights
to shorter term forward rates, which might well be substantially lower than
the longer term rates.—11—
are for actual delivery and payment early in these months, about two
business days after the quotation date. The data for January 1947 to
April 1966 were collected by Reuben A. Kessel from the quotation sheets
of Salomon Brothers, and were processed under the supervision of Merton
H. Miller and Myron Scholes. The data for May 1966 to June 1975 were
collected from Salomon Brothers quotation sheets by Joel Messina and
obtained with the assistance of Jay Morrisson. The data for July 1975
to June 1977 were collected from Wall Street Journal composite dealer
quotations by Krista Chinn under the direction of the present author.
All tax—exempt securities were rejected as being non—representa-
tive of the market as a whole. (By the mid—1950's all but a handful
of these had disappeared). "Flower bonds" often sell at a price premium
because they can be surrendered at par value in payment of estate taxes
if they are owned by the decedant at the time of his death. It was not
practical to omit all of them, because for many years they constituted
most if not all of the long—term securities. The following compromise
was adopted for flower bonds: Those that 1) were selling below par;
2) matured after 1982; and 3) were selling within $4 per $100 of face value
of the lowest priced flower bond were excluded. Any that did not meet
all three of these criteria were included.1 No attempt was made to com-
pensate for the price discount that existed on many bonds in the earlier
part of the period because of their ineligibility for commercial bank
purchase. This discount was greatly reduced after the Accord of March 1951,
and most of these bonds became eligible by the mid—1950's. Except for the
'See MeCulloch (1975b, 817—822) for further discussion of these estate
tax bonds.—12—
tax—exempts and selected flower bonds, almost all U.S. Treasury Bills, Notes,
and Bonds were included.
From this data discount functions were fit using a cubic spline,
tax—adjusted technique similar to that described in McCulloch(1975c))
This technique was slightly improved by setting the "flat" price equal to
the present discounted value of the sum of the after—tax semi—annual interest
payments plus the principal, rather than using our earlier simplification
of setting the "and interest" price equal to the integrated present dis-
counted value of the after—tax couponspius the principal, which treats
the coupons as if they arrived in a continuous stream. Before—tax equi-
valent instantaneous forward rates, single payment yields, and par bond
yields were calculated from the parameters of this spline discount curve
for selected standard maturities sufficiently close together to allow linear
2
interpolation when desired.
Appendix I indicates for each month the largest standard maturity
less than or equal to the maturity of the longest outstanding security
observed. For most months we have more than 20 and sometimes even 30 years
of data, though there were a few years in the early 1970's when our rule
for flower bonds forced us to cut back to 14 or even 13 years. Fortunately,
these months had relatively high levels of interest rates so that forward
rates beyond these maturities would have had relatively little weight in
the par bond yield anyway. Appendix 2 shows the par bond yield for the
longest available maturity for each month. This series also appears on
1The tax adjustment is especially important n the late 1950's and 1960's,
when the long term market was dominated by bonds selling well below par and
having a substantial capital gains tax advantage.
'These series, together with a batch version of the FORTRAN IV program that
generated them, will be available from the NBER in New York, together with fur-
ther description. The author takes sole responsibility for them, however.—13—
Chart I. Although these rates (and the other rates discussed below)
are at best accurate to 1 or 2 basis points (.01 or .02 percent per
annum), we have tabulated them to the nearest tenth of a basic point, to
prevent their stochastic properties from being affected in any way by
rounding errors.
THE LIQUIDITYPREMIUM
Forall 365pairs of adjacent months, (t) was computed as in
(19),using the longestmaturity available both at time t and(by inter-
polation) at time t + tat. Appendix 3 shows the accumulated sum of these
increments. We have arbitrarily started the series at 2.241%, the longest
available par bond yield at the beginning of January 1947.
Changes in this series are not pure unanticipated changes in interest
rates, since forward rates are known to exceed expected future spot rates
by a liquidity premium. Long (1972) has recently refuted the traditional
Hicksian explanation of this premium in terms of risk aversion in the
face of interest rate uncertainty, thus confirming the intuition of Bailey
(1964, 554) that risk aversion can just as easily lead to a "solidity premium"
(negative liquidity premium) as a positive liquidity premium. Neverthe-
less, the evidence indicates that a positive liquidity premium does exist
at the very short end of the term structure. This sort of premium could
be due to the demand for liquid secondary reserves on the part of traditional
banks, as suggested by Lutz (1940, 48), or perhaps to interaction with the
demand for money, as argued by Kessel (1965, 44—58).
For the specific purpose of being able to adjust forward interest
rates to infer participants' expectations of future interest rates, we
*
Becauseof reduction difficulties, Chart I is not included with this draft.—14—
have, in a separate paper (McCulloch 1975a), measured the size of this
liquidity premium for a broad range of maturities, using data from 1947
to 1966. We found that if the term premium is not constrained to have
any particular shape with respect to maturity, it cannot be estimated with
any usable accuracy for implicit forward contracts longer than a year or
so in duration. However, if we define the premium rr(m) on an instantan-
eous forward rate p(t, t ÷m)as the difference between this forward
rate and the market's expectation, as of time t, of the future "spOt"
interest rate p(t + m, t + m),
ir(m) =p(t,t + m) —EP(t
+ m, t + m), (20)
we found that this premium does not differ significantly from the functional
form —am
ir(m)=b(l—e), (21)
where —l a =6.059yr
and
b =.4335percent per year.
This functional form implies that the typical shape of the forward curve,
as well as that of the yield curve, increases monotonically towards an
asymptote 43 basis points above its lowest value. For theforward curve,
it more than half—way approaches this asymptote in 2 months (1/6 year).
The yield curve approaches the same asymptote, but more slowly. A premium
like this, that monotonically increases toward an asymptote, is consistent
with the theories of Lutz and Kessel, so for present purposes we accept this
functional form as valid.
Equation (21) implies a very small liquidity premium for forward con-
tracts of long maturity. If m2 is the duration of the forward contract—15—
(2 —S1 indefinition (7)) ,itcan be shown that the premium is, at the
.95 confidence level, less than 10/rn2 basis points, regardless of the
distance into the future the forward contract is to begin (McCulloch
1975a, 115). Thus, on a 10 year single payment implicit forward contract, the
premium is less than 1 basis point, hardly worth bothering with by itself.
However, in the present paper we propose to accumulate 365 fore-
casting errors, so these liquidity premia may add up to a substantial
sum. In order to adjust for this premium, we must derive the premium in
a forward par bond yield implied by formula (21). Since expectations
must fluctuate randomly (see McCulloch l975a, 98 text andn.6), we just have
E p(t+m, t+m) =E[E p(t+w, t-4-m)] (22)
t tt+m1
for allmgreater than tn.. Therefore
p(t, t+m) =Ep(t+m, t+m)+ ir(m)
=Et[Et+mp(t+m, t-fm)]+ir(m)






















is the approximate value of the liquidity premium in the forward
rate on a par bond of maturity to be bought or sold years,
and m2 is again m3m1.
This approximate premium is a function of the exact shape of the
discount function at time t, which makes it difficult to evaluate.
However, by a further approximation, we can obtain a simple expression
for it. Suppose that R(t) is the "general level" of interest rates at




















Note that although our specification (21) of the liquiditypremium on instan-
taneous forward rates (and therefore on single payment forwardrates as in (9))
does not depend on the level of interest rates, the derivedapproximate premium
p(R(t), m1,m2) in (27) does depend on this level. This isbecause the forward
par bond yield gives higher weight to shorter term p(t,s)'s, (which have the
largest liquidity premia), the higher the level of interest rates. Itwill there-
fore be an increasing function of the level. Toillustrate, if in1 is 1/12 years,
is 20 years, and interest rates stand at 2½% (R(t) =.025),the premium will
be 0.18 basis points (0.0018%). At 5% interest, thepremium will rise to 0.22
basis points, and at 107., to 0.32 basis points. Bythemselves, these adjustments
are well less than the measurement error in the forward par bond yield, but they will
accumulate to a noticeable amount over 30 years.
Appendix 4 shows the accumulated sum of the incrementsiy(t) to each of
which has been added a liquidity premium adjustment calculatedwith (27). For
each month the current value of y(t, s*(t)_t)/l00was used as R(t). As with
the series in Appendix 3, we arbitrarily start this seriesat the initial level
of the longest available par bond yield, 2.241%. In thiscase, however, it
rises to 3.918%, instead of to 3.203%, a difference of71.5 basis points over
365 months. This difference averages to about 0.20 basispoints per month.—18—
Our adjusted sum of increments still leaves a little to be desired.
First, there is no reason why it could not go negative, and thus behave
unlike an interest rate series. To illustrate, suppose that initially
the one—year rate stands at 2% and the two—year rate at 3%, so that parti-
cipants expect next year's one—year rate to be 4% (abstracting from
liquidity premium). If Instead next year's one—year rate is 1%, there
will have been an unanticipated fall of 4 —1=3%.This fall will take
the cumulative sum to —1%, even though all actual interest rates and
expected rates are in fact positive. Nothing this extreme actually occurs,
though we can find intervals when a rise in yields to maturity was actually
overanticipated, and therefore represents an unanticipated fall in
interest rates. There are only a few individual months for which this
occurred, though it is not uncommon over periods of several months. One
example is the period from January 1947 to August 1954, when the long
term par bond yield rose from 2.241%,to 2.549%, a rise of 30.8 basis points,
yet the cumulative sum of unanticipated changes fell from 2.241% to 1.853%,
an unanticipated fall of 38.8 basis points.
A more important problem is that changes in the cumulative sum of
unanticipated changes series reflect the actual unanticipated change in
terms of percentage points, so that relative changes in this series do not
ref 1ct similar relative differences between the expected par bond yield
and the subsequent spot yield. For example, a rise from 6% to 8% repre-
sents the same percentage change in the price of a perpetuity (which a
long term par bond approximates) as does a rise from 3% to 4%. Yet if
the cumulative sum series happened to stand at 3% at the beginning of a
month when the market was anticipating a 6% par bond yield for the end of—19—
the month, an 8% realization would drive the cumulative sum series to
5%, the same percentage point change, but twice the relative change,
that actually occurred.
In order to correct both these problems, the series we should
actually concentrate on is the multiplicatively cumulative unanticipated
change in long term bond yields, which we will call y*(t). We again
start this series at 2.241%, and thereafter define it by multiplying
its previous value by the ratio of the realized spot yield to the pre—
vio.usly anticipated corresponding yield, adjusted for liquidity premium:
=*(t)Y(tt,s*(t) —t-t)
b(t,t, s*(t)_tJ_pR(t),t,s*(t)_t_tJ (28)
Relativechanges in this series, even over several months or years, then
represent the actual cumulative relative change in interest rates, even for
periods when its value has drifted far away from the actual current level
of interest rates.
In order to make it available for other researchers, we have
shown the full series in Table 1, page 21. It is never accurate to
within less than a basis point, but we have again indicated the tenths
of basis points so that its stochastic properties will be unaffected by
rounding considerations.
If all changes in interest rates were correctly anticipated by the
market, our series would never change, regardless of the behavior of
current long—term interest rates. We therefore see from our series, that
while minor fluctuations in interest rates were almostentirely unantici-
pated, the secular rise from 2.24% in 1947 to around 4.2% in 1965 was
almost entirely anticipated by the market. On the otherhand, the large—20—
rise in rates from 1965 to well over 7% five years later (following the
adoption of inflationary financing to help acconmiodate the Viet Nam war),
was almost entirely unanticipated, since it is accompanied by almost
exactly the same proportionate change in y. The slight rise in rates
from 1970 to 1977 was actually somewhat overanticipated, as indicated by
a slight decline in y*.
EVIDENCE ON THE MISINTERMEDIATION HYPOTHESIS
Now let us turn to the object of our investigation, the direction of
unanticipated changes in interest rates over historical business fluctua-
tions. The misintermediation theory predicts unanticipated falls during
disequilibrious contractions, and unanticipated rises during disequili—
brious booms. Now the growth rate of the economy during a period of
perfectly equilibrious development need not be constant. It probably
will not be negative, but even that is not certain. Nevertheless, it
seems safe to assume that recognized historical business tcyclesU, at
least the larger ones, represent unanticipated changes in the growth of
output of consumption goods, and therefore represent the sort of disequi-
librium booms and recessions we are looking for.
Table 2, page 22 indicates the recently revised standard NEER
"reference cycle" peak and trough dates for the period of our series,
and the corresponding value of y*. Since the peak and trough dates
represent extreme activity during the course of the month indicated, while
our y*(t) series refers to the beginning of each month, we have used the
average of y* at the beginning and end of the month in question as being











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Cumulative Unanticipated Change in Interest
Rates over Reference cycles
—1001ogy*












3/75 3.640 + 8.3
Source for dates: Zarnowitz and Boschan (1975, 28, and 1976, 26).—23—
we have indicated the percentage change in y*. We have computed this
change logarithmically, as 100 times the change in the natural logarithm
of y*, so that a 10% rise followed by a 10% fall will leave y* exactly
where it started. Since a long—term par bond approximates a perpetuity,
whose price is the reciprocal of its yield, these percentage changes
roughly indicate the unanticipated fluctuations in the value of current
output relative to a constant stream of future output. Thus, output
in April of 1958 was worth 16.4% less in terms of future output than the
market anticipated it would be worth eight months previously.
We see that in all but two of the eleven phases considered, the
unanticipated change in interest rates is, indeed, in the direction pre-
dicted by the misintermediation hypothesis. Although, as Kessel determined,
the market generally correctly determined the direction of change in
interest rates, it systematically underestimated the total change, and
did not overanticipate it. The evidence is therefore consistent with
the assertion that most postwar U.S. business fluctuations were caused
by the mismatching of intertetnporal consumption and production plans
brought about by misintermediation.
The two exceptions are the contraction that set in as a consequence
of the Arab oil embargo in late 1973, and the preceding expansion that was
interrupted by the oil situation. Since it seems safe to assume that
the Arab oil embargo was not caused by the maturity structure of the
balance sheets of U.S. financial institutions, we may conclude that mis—
intermediation is not responsible for all business fluctuations. Never-
theless, in every case when the unanticipated change in the value of output
relative to future output is 10% or larger, the change is in the direction—24—
predicted by this hypothesis.
Because the Burns—Mitchell reference cycle concept only recog-
nizes absolute reductions in output as contractions, it may overlook
disequilibriously sluggish periods when the growth rate is positive
but not as high as anticipated. Even for the fluctuations it recog-
nizes, it may tend to place peaks too late and the troughs too early,
since when a trend is added to a pure cyclic series, the maxima tend to
be retarded and the minima advanced in time. To avoid these problems,
Ilse Mintz has constructed a "Growth Cyclet chronology, shown in Table 3,
page 25. Essentially, the upturns and downturns in this chronology
identify peaks and troughs in detrended aggregate economic activity.
The direction of change is in the direction consistent with the
misintermediation hypothesis in five out of nine growth contractions
and in six out of eight growth expansions, a majority of cases but not
an overwhelming majority. However, two of the four contractions with
increases in y* and one of the two expansions with decreases in y* have
changes that are smaller than 2% in absolute value. Two of the remaining
three exceptions are associated with the oil recession of 1973—1975.
The remaining exception is the mini—recession of 1966—1967, which on the
one hand was not a major recession, and which on the other hand occurred
at a time of rising inflationary expectations. Even then, there was a
substantial fall in the series during the course of the mini—recession,
from September 1966 to February 1967.
In order to test whether the cumulative unanticipated change in
interest rates is significantly pro—cyclic, we calcu1ted the mean monthly
change in the logarithm of this series, separately for contractions and expansions.—25—
TABLE 3
Cumulative UnanticipatedChange in Interest
Rates over GrowthCycles
—lOOlogy*




10/49 1.994 —13.7 6/51
2.196
+9.6 6/52 2.102 —4.4 3/53
2.290
+8.6 8/54 1.934 —16.9 2/57
2.296
+17.2 5/58 2.081 —9.8 2/60
2.634
+23.6 2/61 2.282 —14.3 4/62
2.274
—0.4 3/63 2.286 + 0.5 6/66
2.646
+14.6 10/67 2.962 +11.3 3/69
3.450
+15.3 11/70 3.500 + 1.4 3/73
3.148
—10.6 4/75 3.771 +18.1
Sources for dates:
Mintz (1974,60), Moore(1975, 159) and Zarnovjtz and Boschan (1976,26). Thisdeflatedseries chronology ismore widely accepted than Mintz's
alternative undeflated
series chronology (1974,59).—26—
These results are shown in Table 4, on page 27. In each case we excluded
the changes that occurred during the actual peak and trough months, since
it is ambiguous whether they belong to the expansion or to the contraction.
The t tests indicate that log y decreases significantly during reference
expansions and increases significantly during reference expansions. It declines
during growth contractions, though not significantly, and increases signif 1—
cantly during growth expansions. In both types of cycle the difference in
means indicates that the expected change is significantly higher for expansions
than for contractions. The normalized von Neumann ratios ttNVtP (which have
been normalized to have mean 0, standard deviation approximately 1.0, and to be
positive when positive serial correlation is present) throughout indicate no
significant serial correlation.
However, the standarized range statistic "SR", defined as the range
divided by the estimated standard deviation, is highly significant for all
cases, indicating significant leptokurtosis, which violates the normality
assumption necessary to use the t test. The statistic
2n -n
Xd = ' (29)
where n is the number of observations on the change and n is the number
of these observations where the change is positive, is asymptotically
N(0,l), and enables us to test for the sign of the median change without
relying on a normal assumption.'
'We do assume here that the distribution of forecasting errors is more
or less symmetrical, so that the mean and median have the same sign.—27—
TABLE4
MeanMonth—to—Month Changes, by Phase
—100log y* — — 100log 'L —
Reference Growth Reference Growth
Cycles Cycles Cycles Cycles
Contractions
Meanchange(1) —.871 —.171 —.498 .053
t —2.08 —.63 —1.24 .20
NvNR .92 —.26 1.46 .07
SR 7.38 7.61 6.52 6.56
x —1.81 —.86 —1.03 .69 med
Expansions
Mean change (2) .435 .493 .631 .713
t 2.67 2.67 3.76 3.70
NvNR .43 1.26 .99 1.86
SR 6.85 7.24 6.87 7.19
x 2.24 2.30 3.64 3.22 med
Difference
(2)—(l) 1.305 .664 1.129 .659
t 2.91 2.02 2.60 2.01
6.87 4.75 6.55 2.70
*
Fractilesof SR Statistic .975 .99 .995
Reference Contractions (n =60) 5.705.936.09
ReferenceExpansions (a =245) 6.67 6.937.11
GrowthContractions (n =134) 6.30 6.556.74
GrowthExpansions (n =170) 6.476.726.92
*Interpolatedfrom David etal. (1954, 491).—28—
We see that this statistic is significantly positive for both types of
expansion. It is negative for both types of contraction, though it is
not significantly so in either case. Since the median
fall during contractions is not significant, it is important to test whether
the probability of a rise is significantly higher during an expansion than
during a contraction. This hypothesis can be tested with a simple 2 x 2
contingency table test (e.g. Mood et.al. 1974, 454). This test produces
a statistic which is asymptotically x2j if the probability is the same.
This statistic is significant at the .95 level if over 3.84, and we see
that indeed the probability of y* rising is significantly higher during
expansions than contractions for both chronologies.
For comparison, we also perform the same calculations for YL,the
par bond yield for the longest available maturity, which is the series
tabulated in Appendix 2. We see that it rises significantly during both
types of expansion, by both the t and Xmed test. It falls during reference
contractions, but not significantly even by the t test. During growth
contractions, the mean and median are actually positive, though neither
is significant. Although the difference between expansion behavior and
contraction behavior is significant for reference cycles by both the t
and tests, this difference just barely passes the t test and actually
fails the test for growth cycles.
For further comparison, Appendix 5 shows the behavior of the level of the
additive cumulative unanticipated change y* tabulated in Appendix 4, along
with the level of The results are qualitatively the same as in Table 4,
though the t statistics are uniformly lower, in many cases losing their—29—
significance. Note however, that thestandardized range indicates
stronger leptokurtosjs in every expansioncase, so that the normalassump-
tion and t test are even lesswarranted than in Table 4.Taking logarith
apparently removes much of the
heteroskedasticity in the changes, since
the standard deviation ofchanges has happened to be almostproportional
to the level of interest ratesover our period. Thenon—parametric
statistics are of course unaltered.
By every criterion (except thestrength of rises duringexpansions),
our synthetic cumulative unanticipated
change in interest rates series
y* is actually more reliably
pro—cyclic than the long term interest
rate This is true even though
a series very similar to the latter
is used to date both reference
cycles and growth cycles.
We had hoped that the
unanticipated change in interest rateswould
be significantly pro—cyclic, inspite of Kessel's finding that themarket
has systematically correctlyanticipated at least the direction ofchange
in interest rates over businesscycles. To find that it isactually more
reliably pro—cyclic than the long—terminterest rate itself far exceeds
our hopes for it. Furthermore, the
pro—cyclic nature of our series is
significant by many tests even whenwe include the oil recession of 1973—
1975, which our misintemedjation
theory can excusably be allowednot to .1
explain.
1Because ofa mathematical identity, rises inforward rates go hand in hand with lower holding periodyields for longer term obligations.Therefore, the type of evidence we havelooked at here is similar inultimate-nature to that investigated by Kesseland Clark (1976). In their Table2, Part C, they find unanticipated capital losseson long term bonds duringexpansions from Nov. 1945 to Nov.1970, and Unanticipated capitalgains during contractions. These gains and losses aresignificant, at least using a ttest, so their findings are in conformity withours.—30—
QUALIFICATION
The misintermediation theory of business fluctuations predicts
unanticipated declines in the real Interest rate accompanying recessions
and unanticipated rises in the real interest rate accompanying disequi-
librium booms. What we have shown is that historically, unanticipated
changes in the nominal interest rate are in the direction predicted. We
have no way of knowing for certain from this evidence the direction of
change of the real interest rate. It might be that the entire change has
been in the expected inflation rate and that the real interest rate has
had no unanticipated change at all. It might even be that the real interest
rate actually rises unexpectedly during contractions and falls during ex-
pansions, and that the change in inflationary expectations more than compen-
sates for this behavior of the real rate.
1
It is not implausible that inflationary expectations are pro—cyclic,
and therefore contribute to the pro—cyclic nature of the nominal interest rate.
However, we have no reliable way of reading peoples' minds to determine actual
inflationary expectations, let alone the term structure of inflationary expec-
tations which, strictly speaking, is the necessary consideration.2 It is
difficult to believe that all of the cyclical fluctuation in the nominal inter-
est rate is due to changes in expected inflation, let alone more than one
hundred percent of this fluctuation. Fisher In particular would be forced
to admit that inflationary expectations change only gradually, and do not
vary much over a business cycle lasting a few dozen months. We therefore
maintain that there is a good case for our interpretation of the evidence.
1lndeed, the monetary business cycle theoristsIrving Fisher and Ludwig von
Mises argue that this is in fact the case.
2William Gibson has donesome exploratory work in this direction.—31—
CONCLUS ION
The series we have constructed on the cumulative unanticipated change
in interest rates provides strong evidence in support of the hypothesis
that many business fluctuations of the type that have occurred in the
United States since World War II are caused by the mis—matching of inter—
temporal consumption and production plans. We lay the ultimate blame for
this problem on "misintermediation", the traditional failure by financial
intermediaries to match the maturity structures of their assets and lia-
bilities.
Our synthetic interest rate series turns out to be actually more reliably
pro—cyclic than the simple long—term interest rate, this in spite of the
fact that the latter is used to help construct the standard business cycle
chronologies. It is hoped that this series will be of use to other researchers
in macroeconomics, whether or not they accept its interpretation in terms
of the misintermediation hypothesis.0cc m-'
I-,
c c c c c o c. c a' a'a' a' c a' a' a' C C\ a' a' C a' a' a' a'
—32—
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Mean Month—to—Month Changes, by Phase
—1oOy— —100
Reference Growth Reference Growth
Cycles Cycles Cycles Cycles
Contractions
Mean Change (1) —2.32 0.36 —.75 1.28
t —1.03 .26 —.33 .89
NvNR 1.62 —.25 1.97 .19
SR 6.96 7.37 6.49 6.85
x —1.81 —.86 —1.03 .69 med
Expansions
Mean Change (2) 1.85 1.79 2.62 2.67
t 2.27 1.95 3.13 2.82
NvNR .14 1.16 .69 1.87
SR 8.31 8.73 8.73 9.25
x 2.24 2.30 3.64 3.22 med
Difference
(2)—(1) 4.17 1.42 3.37 1.39
t 1.74 .84 1.39 .81
x 6.87 4.75 6.55 2.70
Note: Since the percentage rates have been multiplied by 100, the mean
monthly changes are in basis points.—37—
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